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KURT C. W IDENHOUSE *

Playpen, the NIT, and Rule 41(b): Electronic
“Searches” for Those Who Do Not Wish to be
Found

INTRODUCTION

After receiving a tip in February 2015, the FBI took control of a child pornography
website named “Playpen” – a site only accessible via the “dark web.”1 Rather than
shutting down Playpen, the FBI apprehended the domain owner and operated the
website from a government facility in the Eastern District of Virginia for two weeks
in order to identify website users – those who were likely to download child
pornography.2 During that time, on February 20, 2015, a FBI special agent applied
to a United States Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District of Virginia for a warrant
to use a Network Investigative Technique, or “NIT,”3 to investigate Playpen’s users
and administrators.4 In support of the warrant application, the applying agent
submitted a thirty-three page affidavit that set forth his basis for probable cause that
deploying the NIT would uncover evidence of child exploitation crimes.5
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1.
In re Search of Computers that Access upf45jv3bziuctml.onion, No. 1:15-SW-89 (E.D. Va. Feb. 20,
2015) [hereinafter NIT Warrant Affidavit]; see infra Part I.1.A (discussing technical explanation of TOR and the
dark web).
2.
Susan Hennessey & Nicholas Weaver, A Judicial Framework for Evaluating Network Investigative
Techniques, LAWFARE: CYBERSECURITY (July 28, 2016, 10:17 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/judicialframework-evaluating-network-investigative-techniques.
3.
“NIT,” or “Network Investigative Technique,” is a program used by the FBI to circumvent electronic
concealment via TOR, see Part I.A.1, or Virtual Proxy Network (VPN). Although the exact details of how the
exploit works have not been officially revealed to prevent its effectiveness from being compromised, it is
generally understood that the NIT plants a program on the suspect’s computer, which, when activated, reveals
specific information about the computer to the FBI. This information includes the suspect’s IP address.
4.
See NIT Warrant Affidavit, supra note 1.
5.
United States v. Owens, No. 16-CR-38-JPS, 2016 WL 7053195, at *1–2 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 5, 2016).
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PLAYPEN, THE NIT, AND RULE 41(B)
Along with monitoring the site’s normal content, the NIT sent additional
instructions to a user’s computer (referred to as the activating computer). 6 These
extra instructions, when downloaded, would cause the activating computer to
transmit certain information to a government computer located in the Eastern District
of Virginia, including: (1) the computer’s actual IP address; (2) a unique identifier to
distinguish the data from that of other computers; (3) the computer’s operating
system; (4) information about whether or not the NIT had already been delivered to
the computer; (5) the computer’s “Host Name”; (6) the computer’s active operating
system username; and (7) the computer’s “Media Access Control” address.7 The NIT
would be deployed each time a user logged onto the, now government-controlled,
website.8 In the time following the issuance of the NIT warrant, the FBI obtained
over 1,000 IP addresses from users logging into Playpen.9 This unprecedented sting
resulted in over 100 persons criminally charged with possession of child
pornography.10
While the Playpen operation was a significant law enforcement success, with
unquestionable social benefits, the NIT warrant and resulting onslaught of cases
highlight the legal uncertainty of what constitutes a search in the electronic age. In
dealing with the NIT warrant, circuits have disagreed on: (1) whether the NIT-issuing
magistrate had authority to issue the warrants for a “search” outside his jurisdiction,
(2) whether the FBI needed a warrant at all, and (3) what the appropriate remedy
would be.11
As the precedent lies, it is disturbingly unlikely that the FBI’s implementation of
the NIT constitutes a search. For privacy proponents, there remains a ray of hope.
While circuit courts have disagreed on a magistrate’s authority to issue warrants for
these electronic “searches,” an amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41(b) has settled the issue by explicitly allowing warrants where the jurisdiction of
the person or place to be searched has been concealed through electronic means. 12
Thus, it is possible that information collected by the FBI that did not previously
require a warrant, now needs one. There is a new, specific, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure allowing magistrates to issue such warrants. The real question is how the
courts will view a warrantless deployment of the NIT. Because there is now a rule
almost specifically tailored to NIT deployment, it is possible courts will be more
likely to find NIT deployment is a search requiring such a warrant.

6.

NIT Warrant Affidavit, supra note 1, ¶ 33.
Id. ¶¶ 33–34, 36.
8.
Id. ¶ 36.
9.
The Playpen Cases: Frequently Asked Questions, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/
pages/playpen-cases-frequently-asked-questions#whathappened
10.
Id.
11.
See infra notes 31, 33 and accompanying text.
12.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6).
7.
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I. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND, LEGAL BACKGROUND, AND NOTABLE CASES

It is necessary to lay a short technical foundation in order to understand how the law
functions regarding electronic searches. For the purposes of this article, I will briefly
explain what The Onion Router is and what IP addresses are. After the background,
I will discuss the driving legal principles themselves, including Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41(b) and amendment thereof, the Fourth Amendment
expectation of privacy and trespass as a test for the warrant requirement, suppression
as a remedy, and the Good Faith Exception for law enforcement. Lastly, I will give
examples how the circuit courts have applied the legal principles to The Onion
Router and Internet Protocol addresses, resulting in a splintering of decisions.
A. Technical Background
1. What Is “TOR?”
The United States Naval Research Lab initiated The Onion Router (“TOR”) in the
1990s as a means to protect government communications. 13 After acquiring
independent sponsors,14 TOR became an independent non-profit, available to the
general public. Anyone can use TOR for legitimate reasons to “improve their privacy
and security on the Internet,”15 though the program is notorious for its more nefarious
uses (i.e. child pornography and the “Silk Road”– a network for online drug
purchases).16 TOR operates via a group of volunteer-operated servers to create a
network of “virtual tunnels,” allowing users to connect to a website anonymously. 17
Rather than making a direct connection between a computer and a website, TOR
routes a connection through different “nodes” in the TOR network, thereby obscuring
aspects of how and where its users are accessing the Internet.18 This allows users to
circumvent software designed to censor content, to avoid tracking of their browsing
behaviors, and to facilitate other forms of anonymous communication.19 TOR also
allows access to the “dark web,” that is, those sites not indexed by search engines
and which require specific software to access.20 Playpen, for example, was only

13.

Inception, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/torusers.html.en (last visited Dec. 1, 2017).
Sponsors, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/sponsors.html.en (last visited Dec. 1, 2017).
15.
TOR: Overview, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited Dec. 1, 2017).
16.
Nate Anderson & Cyrus Farivar, How the feds took down the Dread Pirate Roberts, Arstechnica, (Oct.
3, 2013, 12:00 AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/10/how-the-feds-took-down-the-dread-pirateroberts/.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
See Andy Greenberg, Hacker Lexicon: What Is The Dark Web?, WIRED, (Nov. 19, 2014, 7:15 AM),
http://www.wired.com/2014/11/hacker-lexicon-whats-dark-web/.
14.
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available on the “dark web” and accessible via TOR, like many other clandestine
websites.21
2. What Exactly Is an IP Address?
An Internet Protocol (IP) address is a “unique numerical address identifying each
computer on the internet.”22 Every computer or server connected to the Internet has
a unique IP address.23 IP addresses can be dynamic, meaning that the Internet Service
Provider (ISP) assigns a different unique number to a computer every time it accesses
the Internet.24 IP addresses may also be static, if an ISP assigns a user’s computer a
specific IP address each time that computer accesses the Internet.25 Computer
servers, including web servers, use IP addresses to communicate with other
computers.26 In some sense, an IP address is like a physical address a carrier needs
to direct a package. Computers use IP addresses to route and deliver “packets” of
information to each other.27 Just as a physical address tells mail carriers where to
direct a letter, an IP address tells providers where a device is and how to find it. This
method makes sending and receiving information over the internet possible.28
B. Legal Background
1. Rule 41 and Jurisdiction
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b) originally described five scenarios in
which a federal magistrate judge has authority to issue a warrant. Subsection (b)(1)
states the general rule that, “a magistrate judge with authority in the district . . . has
authority to issue a warrant to search for and seize a person or property located in the
district.”29 The following four subsections provide that a magistrate judge has
authority to issue a warrant: (2) if the person or property is located within the district
but might move or be moved outside the district before the warrant is executed; (3)
if the magistrate judge sits in a district in which activities related to terrorism have

21.

Id.
In re Application of the United States of America for an Order Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register
and Trap on [xxx] Internet Service Account/User Name [xxxxxxxx@xxx.com], 396 F. Supp. 2d 45, 48 (D. Mass.
2005).
23.
United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007).
24.
See generally Stephanie Crawford, What is an IP address?, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://computer.how
stuffworks.com/internet/basics/question549.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2017).
25.
Id.
26.
Affidavit In Support of Application For Search Warrant, In the Matter of the Search of Computers That
Access Websites 1-23, ¶5(m), 13-1744 WC (July 22, 2013).
27. Crawford, supra note 24.
28. Id.
29. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1).
22.
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occurred; (4) to install a tracking device within the district, though the magistrate
judge may authorize the continued use of the device if the person or object
subsequently moves outside of the district; and (5) where the criminal activities occur
in the District of Columbia, any United States territory, or on any land or within any
building outside of the country owned by the United States or used by a United States
diplomat.30
Circuit courts are split over whether or not the magistrate judge in Virginia had
authority under Rule 41(b)(1-5) to issue a warrant out of his jurisdiction regarding
use of the NIT.31 The most commonly cited justifications allowing such warrants
were subsections (1), (2), and (4) – issuing a warrant for a search inside the district,
a search for a person or property that started inside the district and moved out, and
installing a tracking device while inside the district, respectively. 32 Even courts that
found a magistrate lacked such authority usually did not agree that suppression is

30.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(2)–(5).
See United States v. Croghan, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1085–86 (S.D. Iowa Sept. 19, 2016), rev’d and
rem’d by United States v. Horton 863 F.3d 1041 (July 24, 2017). A few district courts conclude that the NIT
Warrant was unlawfully issued and suppressed all fruits of it. See, e.g., United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d
26, 35 (D. Mass. 2016); United States v. Workman, 205 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1263 (D. Colo. 2016), rev’d by United
States v. Workman 863 F.3d 1313 (2017). Other courts found that while the NIT Warrant may have been issued
unlawfully, suppression was not warranted, either under the exclusionary rule in general or pursuant to the United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) good faith exception. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, No. 5:16–cr–285,
2016 WL 4821223 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2016); United States v. Adams, No. 6:16–cr–11, 2016 WL 4212079 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 10, 2016); United States v. Acevedo–Lemus, No. 15–00137, 2016 WL 4208436 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8,
2016); United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431 (E.D. Pa. 2016); United States v. Epich, No. 15–cr–163–
PP, 2016 WL 953269 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 14, 2016); United States v. Michaud, No 3:15–cr–05351–RJB, 2016 WL
337263 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016). And other courts conclude that a magistrate possessed adequate authority
to issue the NIT Warrant under Rule 41 such that there was no legal violation that would require suppression.
See, e.g., United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920 (W.D. Ark. 2016); United States v. Eure, No 2:16cr43, 2016
WL 4059663 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2016); United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585 (E.D. Va. 2016) (foregoing
R. 41(b) jurisdictional analysis because the court was sitting Virginia, the issuing district); United States v. Darby,
190 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Va. 2016); United States v. Austin, 230 F. Supp. 3d 828, (M.D. Tenn. 2017); United
States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770, (N.D. W. Va., 2016); United States v. McLamb, 220 F. Supp. 3d 663 (E.D.
Va. 2016); United States v. Sullivan, 229 F. Supp. 3d 647 (N.D. Ohio 2017).
32. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
31.
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appropriate.33 However, the recent change to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure renders this question moot.34
As of December 1, 2016, Rule 41 added a new provision to 41(b), amending
magistrate power to issue search warrants outside their jurisdiction in certain
circumstances.35 The amendment reads:
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b)
*

*

*

*

(6) a magistrate judge with authority in any district where activities
related to a crime may have occurred has authority to issue a warrant to
use remote access to search electronic storage media and to seize or copy
electronically stored information located within or outside that district if:
(A) the district where the media or information is located has been
concealed through technological means. . .36
*

*

*

*

Thus, the Supreme Court approved a new provision,37 now in effect, that resolves
the question as to whether or not jurisdictional issues will prevent a magistrate from
allowing use of the NIT to “search” outside their district. 38 The answer, taken from
33. Leon, 468 U.S. at 920 (explaining the requirements for the Good Faith Exception); see Torres, 2016 WL
4821223, at *6; Adams, 2016 WL 4212079, at *2; Acevedo–Lemus, 2016 WL 4208436, at *3; Werdene, 188 F.
Supp. 3d at 436; compare Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *6–7 (finding violation of Rule 41(b) but suppression
unwarranted because defendant was not prejudiced and FBI agents acted in good faith), and Epich, 2016 WL
953269, at *2 (rejecting Defendant’s contention that Rule 41 was violated and finding suppression unwarranted
even if it was), with Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 35 (finding suppression warranted because Rule 41 “implicates
substantive judicial authority,” Defendant was prejudiced even if the violation was technical, and the Good Faith
Exception to the exclusionary rule is not available because the warrant was void ab initio).
34. As the case law stands, note that a majority of courts have refused to suppress evidence in these cases,
regardless a finding that deployment of the NIT was a search and the magistrate lacked jurisdiction. To these
courts, the Good Faith exception reigns supreme.
35. Rule 41 Changes Ensure a Judge May Consider Warrants For Certain Remote Searches, THE UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ARCHIVES (June 20, 2016) https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/rule-41changes-ensure-judge-may-consider-warrants-certain-remote-searches.
36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) (2016) (Emphasis added)
37. Pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, the Supreme Court Propagates the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
subject to Congressional Approval. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990).
38. The Advisory Committee’s records, which highlight the reasoning the for the change, note:
The proposal speaks to two increasingly common situations affected by the territorial restriction,
each involving remote access searches, in which the government seeks to obtain access to electronic
information or an electronic storage device by sending surveillance software over the Internet. In the
first situation, the warrant sufficiently describes the computer to be searched, but the district within
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the plain text of the amendment, is clear that magistrate judges have such authority.
However, the question whether deployment of the NIT is a search under the Fourth
Amendment remains unanswered.
2. Fourth Amendment and Expectation of Privacy
While Rule 41 deals with a magistrate’s jurisdiction for warrants, the warrant
requirement itself protects U.S. persons from unreasonable government intrusion.
Law enforcement does not need a warrant if no “search” occurs.39 “Searches” only
require warrants when a government actor implicates the Fourth Amendment. 40 The
Supreme Court of the United States has “uniformly . . . held that the application of
the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can
claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has
been invaded by the government action.”41 That inquiry is analyzed in two parts: (1)
whether the individual, through his conduct, “exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy;” and (2) whether the individual’s subjective expectation of
privacy is “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’” (i.e. an objective
expectation of privacy).42
i. Subjective Expectation of Privacy
To meet a subjective expectation of privacy, one must demonstrate that he had an
actual, personal expectation of privacy.43 In other words, a person asserting the
government conducted a search requiring a warrant must show that he held the
evidence in a manner designed to ensure its privacy. 44 Thus, while the Court in Katz
v. United States and Smith v. Maryland extended Fourth Amendment protection to
what a person goes to lengths to keep private, the Court did not protect activities one

which the computer is located is unknown. This situation is occurring with increasing frequency
because persons who commit crimes using the Internet are using sophisticated anonymizing
technologies . . . [such as] proxy services designed to hide their true IP addresses.
Report of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (May
2015).
39.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures).
40.
Id.
41.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (adopting the Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
standard).
42.
Id.; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
43.
See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (“Katz posits a two-part inquiry: first, has the
individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search?”).
44.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection.”).
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“knowingly exposes to the public.”45 This is the Third-Party Doctrine:46 “where an
individual makes information available to a third party, the government may obtain
the information without a warrant, regardless of whether the act includes subjectively
reasonable private behavior.”47 In essence, failing to keep an item or activity from
being exposed to anyone but yourself risks losing the protection of the warrant
requirement under the Fourth Amendment.48 By exposing an activity to another
party, you destroy the reasonable expectation of privacy and lose Fourth Amendment
protections.
How the Third-Party Doctrine applies to modern technology is still up for
debate.49 Smith reasoned, “[a]ll telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone
numbers to the telephone companies, since it is through telephone company
switching equipment that their calls are completed.”50 Some lower courts equate this
logic to IP addresses: “[N]o reasonable expectation of privacy exists in an IP address,
because that information is also conveyed to and from third parties, including
[internet service providers].”51 However, the Supreme Court has never definitively
ruled on the issue.
ii. Objective Expectation of Privacy
Defendants must also have an objective expectation of privacy, the second part of
the Katz test.52 The expectation must be “one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”53 Most importantly for the immediate topic, an objective expectation
of privacy does not include any expectations of privacy in illegal activities. This

45.

Id.
See Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44 (no expectation of privacy in phone numbers dialed because they were
turned over to the phone company).
47. Sophia Dastagir Vogt, The Digital Underworld: Combating Crime on the Dark Web in the Modern Era,
15 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 104, 111 (2017).
48. Id.
49. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417-18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“More fundamentally,
it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.
People . . . can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat
secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy.”).
50. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).
51. United States v. Christie, 624 F.3d 558, 574 (3d Cir. 2010); see also United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d
500, 509–10 (9th Cir. 2008) (comparing IP addresses to the outside of a letter and the monitoring of IP addresses
to a pen register).
52. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
53. Id.
46.
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includes hijacking a neighbor’s Internet access in order to share child pornography
with a third party.54
3. Intrusion into a Constitutionally-Protected Area: Trespass
While modern courts focus on the reasonable expectation of privacy test from Katz,
the original “trespass” test for the Fourth Amendment under United States v. Jones
still stands.55 Jones held that the Fourth Amendment protects against governmental,
physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area to obtain information. 56 Such
actions constitute a “search” under the Fourth Amendment and are therefore subject
to the warrant requirement.57 For “trespass” analysis, expectation of privacy will not
necessarily matter because the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test adds to,
but does not substitute for, the common-law trespassory test.58 Essentially, Katz did
not repudiate the understanding that the Fourth Amendment embodies a particular
concern of government trespass upon protected areas.59 Thus, there are
circumstances where a governmental action fails to qualify as a “search” under the
Fourth Amendment by the Katz test, but qualifies as a “search” under the Jones’s
trespass analysis.60
4. The Exclusionary Rule – Suppression as a Remedy
The exclusionary rule was developed “[t]o deter Fourth Amendment violations.”61
When the Government seeks to admit evidence collected pursuant to an illegal
search, the rule excludes (suppresses) that evidence, making it unavailable at trial. 62
While suppression is “a judicially created means of effectuating the rights secured

54.

United States v. Stanley, 753 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2014).
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013)
(extending Jones’s trespass analysis to find law enforcement officers’ use of drug-sniffing dog on front porch of
home was a trespassory invasion of the curtilage which constituted a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes).
56.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948–49; see also See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (upholding
against a Fourth Amendment challenge the use of a tracking device placed in a container of chloroform which
was thereafter tracked because it was not a search or seizure).
57.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948–49.
58.
Jardines, 569 U.S. at 5 (“By reason of our decision in Katz v. United States, property rights “are not
the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations,”—but though Katz may add to the baseline, it does not
subtract anything from the Amendment’s protections “when the Government does engage in [a] physical
intrusion of a constitutionally protected area.”) (citations omitted).
59.
Id.
60.
This distinction will come into play, infra, where courts struggle with whether the NIT counted as a
“search” under Katz by comparing expectations of privacy in a defendant’s IP address versus his computer.
Further, it will show how the NIT failed to qualify as a tracking device under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41(b)(4).
61.
See United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 2014).
62.
Id.
55.
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by the Fourth Amendment,”63 a Fourth Amendment violation does not result in
automatic suppression.64 Instead, “exclusion ‘has always been [the court’s] last
resort, not [its] first impulse.’”65 The court has consistently found the exclusionary
rule is not an individual right. It applies only where it “‘result[s] in appreciable
deterrence.’”66 Thus, where applying exclusionary rule would not deter the
government from violating rights, the court will not apply the rule.67
Deterrent value alone is insufficient for application of the exclusionary rule. 68 The
deterrent value must also outweigh the “substantial social costs” of exclusion. 69 Such
costs “often include omitting ‘reliable, trustworthy evidence’ of a defendant’s guilt,
thereby ‘suppress[ing] the truth and set[ting] [a] criminal loose in the community
without punishment.’”70 Because this result runs contrary to the truth-finding
functions of the court, “exclusion is a bitter pill, swallowed only as a last resort.”71
Accordingly, violations warranting exclusion occur “where the deterrent value of
suppression . . . overcome[s] the resulting social costs.” 72
5. The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
The Good Faith Exception to the exclusionary rule “was developed to effectuate [the
balance between deterrent value and societal cost].’” 73 The deterrent value of
suppression tends to outweigh the costs “[w]here officers exhibit ‘deliberate,’
‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment rights.” 74
However, when police act with an “objectively reasonable good-faith belief” in the
legality of their conduct, or when their conduct “involves only simple, isolated
negligence, the deterrence rationale loses much of its force, and exclusion cannot pay
its way.”75 Accordingly, discerning “whether the good faith exception applies
requires courts to answer the ‘objectively ascertainable question whether a
reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal in light

63.
64.

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976).
See Katzin, 769 F.3d at 170 (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009)).
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591

65.
(2006)).
66.
Herring, 555 U.S. at 141 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984)); see also United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)).
67.
Herring, 555 U.S. at 141.
68.
United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2014).
69.
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984).
70.
Katzin, 769 F.3d at 171
71.
Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
72.
Id.
73.
Id. at 171.
74.
Id. (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)).
75.
Id.
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of all of the circumstances.’”76 In essence, egregious police violations of rights would
tend to favor suppressing evidence to deter repetition of the police conduct. But when
police act without gross misconduct and make a small mistake, the balance of
deterrence compared to social cost weighs against the suppression of the wrongly
obtained evidence.
6. Violations of Rule 41(b) and the Result
Rule 41(b) violations are categorized as either fundamental, when of constitutional
magnitude, or technical, when not of constitutional magnitude.77 Violations of Rule
41(b) that are of constitutional magnitude result in suppression of the evidence
(unless some other exception applies).78 In cases where a technical Rule 41(b)
violation occurs, courts may suppress where a defendant suffers prejudice, “in the
sense that the search would not have occurred. . .if the rule had been followed,” or
where law enforcement intentionally and deliberately disregarded the rule.79
C. Notable Cases and Judicial Analysis
In wrestling with Rule 41’s magistrate jurisdiction requirement for warrants,
technology, and the Fourth Amendment, the circuits have come to vastly different
conclusions. The following cases highlight the divergence in reasoning, leading to
findings in which NIT deployment is or is not a search depending on the jurisdiction.
The cases also highlight the pre-amendment Rule 41(b) findings that allow or
disallow magistrate issuance of NIT warrants dependent upon the jurisdiction.
1. Courts Finding Deployment of the NIT was not a “Search,” but Result in Differing
Rule 41(b) Analysis
In United States v. Werdene80 and United States v. Matish,81 both districts found that
the use of the NIT did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search. 82 But, the courts
diverged in their interpretation of Rule 41’s restraint on magistrates’ jurisdiction to

76.

United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2014)
United States v. Negrete-Gonzales, 966 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir. 1995).
78.
See United States v. Krueger, 809 F.3d 1109, 1113–14 (10th Cir. 2015) (ruling if a violation rises to the
level of a Fourth Amendment violation, the violation can be considered constitutional in nature and suppression
is warranted without further evidence of prejudice or reckless disregard. “Unless the defendant can establish
prejudice or intentional disregard of the Rule, a non-constitutional violation of Rule 41 will not, by itself, justify
suppression.”).
79.
United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2005).
80.
188 F. Supp. 3d 431 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
81.
193 F. Supp. 3d 585 (E.D. Va. 2016).
82.
Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 443; Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 613.
77.

VOL. 13, NO. 1 2017

153

WIDENHOUSE Page Proof_v2 (DO NOT DELETE)

1/2/2018 3:58 PM

PLAYPEN, THE NIT, AND RULE 41(B)
issue warrants.83 While the courts reached opposite conclusions on Rule 41’s
conferral of jurisdiction, the outcome of the cases was essentially the same: denial of
suppression of evidence.84
i. United States v. Gabriel Werdene- Introduction
After a magistrate in Virginia issued a warrant permitting deployment of the NIT,
NIT data revealed the IP addresses of visitors to the Playpen website – including
Gabriel Werdene.85 Despite Werdene’s use of TOR to conceal his IP and physical
address, the NIT revealed that he lived in Pennsylvania. However, the NIT warrant
came from an Eastern District of Virginia magistrate. 86 Werdene was indicted on
September 17, 2015 on one count of possessing and attempting to possess child
pornography pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2).87 The indictment
was based on evidence obtained during a June 17, 2015 search of Werdene’s
Bensalem, Pennsylvania home, which was conducted in accordance with a warrant
issued by a magistrate judge in that judicial district (and based on probable cause
stemming from use of the NIT).88 Werdene moved to suppress the evidence seized
from his home, arguing that under Rule 41 the magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction
to authorize the NIT and the search of his IP address violated his Fourth Amendment
rights.89
ii. Werdene– Rule 41 and Jurisdiction
The court found the Government’s argument for a flexible application of Rule 41’s
jurisdictional conference unpersuasive, but found that no search under the Fourth
Amendment had occurred.90 Arguments that “Congress has not caught up with the
changes in technology” and “Rule 41(b) is to be applied flexibly, not rigidly” were
unsuccessful.91 The simple fact was that in Werdene’s case, the target of the NIT was
located outside of the magistrate judge’s district and beyond her jurisdiction under
subsection (b)(1).92 The property seized pursuant to the NIT warrant was not the
server located in Newington, Virginia, but the IP address and related material “[f]rom

83.

Compare Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 442–443., with Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 612.
Throughout these cases, denial of suppression is the most prevalent result. But see United States v.
Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 36 (D. Mass. 2016).
85. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 435.
86.
Id.
87.
Id. at 435.
88.
Id.
89.
Id. at 436.
90.
Id at 442–43.
91.
United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 442–43 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
92.
Id.; see supra Part I.B.1.
84.
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any ‘activating’ computer” that accessed Playpen. 93 The material was located outside
of Virginia, so the magistrate did not have authority to issue the warrant under Rule
41(b)(1).94 Likewise, Subsections (b)(2) and (b)(4) (the tracking provision), the only
other provisions potentially applicable, were premised on the person or property
being located within the issuing court’s district. 95 It was uncontested that the
computer information that the NIT targeted was at all relevant times located beyond
the boundaries of the Eastern District of Virginia.96 Therefore, the magistrate judge
was accordingly without authority to issue the NIT warrant. 97
However, the court concluded that because Werdene did not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his IP address, the NIT used by government was not a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment.98 Therefore, the magistrate’s violation in
issuing extra-territorial warrants was not a constitutional concern. 99 Nor was
Werdene’s subjective expectation of privacy reasonable.100 His expectation was not
“[a subjective expectation] that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”101
Werdene failed both parts of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy analysis.102
The court concluded that assuming Werdene had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the information obtained by the NIT, suppression was not the appropriate
remedy.103 Because exclusion is not a personal right and not guaranteed by the
Constitution,104 application of the exclusionary rule is “limited to those ‘unusual
cases’ in which it may achieve its objective: to appreciably deter governmental
violations of the Fourth Amendment.”105 That deterrent value must outweigh social
costs of excluding the evidence.106

93.

Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 442–43.
Id.; compare id., with United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 612 (E.D. Va. 2016) (holding the
magistrate had authority to issue the warrant under 41(b)(4)).
95.
Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 442.
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. at 443 (“Specifically, he must articulate how the Government’s failure to comply with Rule 41(b)
caused a search or seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. He cannot do so.”).
99.
Id.
100.
Id. at 445.
101.
United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 445 (E.D. Pa. 2016)
102.
Id. at 446
103.
Id. at 448.
104.
Id. citing Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236, 285 (2011) (exclusion was not “designed to ‘redress
the injury’ occasioned by an unconstitutional search.”) (citation omitted); see Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586,
591–92 (2006) (whether suppression is appropriate under the exclusionary rule is a separate question from
whether a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated).
105.
Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d, at 448 (quoting United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 2014));
see generally, supra, Part II.B.
106.
Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 448.
94.
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Following that logic, even if deployment of the NIT was a search and violated
Rule 41, the Good Faith Exception to the exclusionary rule applied. Because the FBI
acted “upon an objectively reasonable good faith belief in the legality of their
conduct,” the court essentially would not punish the FBI for relying in good faith on
the warrant.107
iii. United States v. Matish - Introduction
Like in Werdene, prosecution of Edward Matish stemmed from the Government’s
investigation into the child pornography website, Playpen. 108 Matish accessed
Playpen via TOR in an attempt to keep his IP address anonymous.109 Following the
deployment of the NIT, the FBI determined Matish’s IP address and sent a subpoena
to his ISP, which identified the computers that possessed that IP address on a
particular date and time.110 Based on this information, the local magistrate authorized
a residential search warrant for Matish’s home, which the FBI executed on July 29,
2015.111 Pursuant to this second warrant, the FBI seized several computers, hard
drives, cell phones, tablets, and video game systems.112
On February 8, 2016, Matish was named in a four (4) count criminal indictment
charging him with access with intent to view child pornography, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5) and (b)(2).113 These charges stemmed from the information
collected by the NIT, which had provided probable cause for the warrant to search
his home.114 Matish then filed motions to suppress.115
iv. Matish– Rule 41 and Jurisdiction
The court in Matish ultimately concluded use of the NIT was not a search. Thus, a
NIT deployment did not require a warrant.116 However, the court found Rule 41(b)(4)

107.
Id. at 451–52 (observing: (1) the magistrate believed that she had jurisdiction to issue warrant but
mistakenly issued it outside her jurisdiction; (2) agents did not misrepresent how search would be conducted or
where it would be conducted; (3) agents otherwise acted upon objectively reasonable good faith belief in legality
of their conduct; (4) suppression would not have any appreciable effect on law enforcement; and (5)
government’s evidence against defendant was substantial but the government would not have any case without
it.).
108.
United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 593 (E.D. Va. 2016).
109.
Id. at 593–94.
110.
Id. at 595–96.
111.
Id. at 596.
112.
Id.
113.
Id. at 592.
114.
United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 596 (E.D. Va. 2016).
115.
Id.
116.
Id. at 618.
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authorized the issuance of the NIT warrant.117 Rule 41(b)(4) endowed a magistrate
with authority to issue a warrant authorizing the use of a tracking device.118 The
tracking device must be installed within the magistrate judge’s district, but the
warrant “may authorize use of the device to track the movement of a person or
property located within the district, outside the district, or both.” 119
The court analogized that provision of Rule 41(b)(4) and adapted it to the virtual
world. Whenever a user entered Playpen, he made “a virtual trip” via the Internet to
Virginia.120 Because the NIT enabled the Government to determine Playpen users’
locations, it resembled a tracking device.121 The court’s technical analysis asserted
that installation did not occur on the government-controlled server but on each
individual computer that logged into Playpen (in the Eastern District of Virginia).122
When that user logged out of Playpen, the NIT determined the location, just as
traditional tracking devices inform law enforcement of a target’s location.123 Thus,
Rule 41(b)(4) applied because this situation was analogous to a tracking device
installed in Virginia which then left the state. 124
Matish also held that even if issuing the warrant extended beyond the magistrate’s
control, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.125 The Government did not need
a warrant to capture the defendant’s IP address because collecting IP addresses was
not a search.126 The defendant transferred his IP addresses to a third party – the TOR
node or ISP – so he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in it.127 The warrant,
even if invalid or void, was unnecessary.128 Specifically, the court found that IP
addresses are information revealed to a third party: “[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.”129 Generally, a user has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in an IP address when using the Internet.130 This stems from the fact that

117.
Id. at 612. Compare id., with United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 442 (E.D. Pa. 2016)
(holding that none of the applicable Rule 41(b) provisions conferred jurisdiction to a magistrate for an NIT
warrant).
118.
Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 612.
119.
Id.
120.
Id. at 612–13.
121.
Id. at 613.
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
124.
United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 613 (E.D. Va. 2016).
125.
Id. at 613–14.
126.
Id.
127.
Id. at 615.
128.
Id. (“Generally, one has no reasonable expectation of privacy in an IP address when using the
Internet.”); see, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509–11 (9th Cir. 2007).
129.
Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 614 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
130.
Id. at 615 (quoting Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509–11).
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Internet users “should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet
service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information.” 131
In essence, the Matish court recognized IP addresses are turned over to third parties
and so there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in them.132 Because there was
no expectation of privacy, the Fourth Amendment did not apply and the FBI needed
no warrant.133 Effectively, the warrant obtained was a bonus.
The Court noted that TOR users might have a subjective expectation of privacy
arising from their use of the network, but they must disclose information, including
their IP addresses, to unknown individuals running TOR nodes to direct their
communications toward their destinations.134 Further, the TOR Project warns users
“that the TOR network has vulnerabilities and that users might not remain
anonymous.”135 Thus, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. 136
When a user connects to the TOR network, he or she must disclose his or her actual
IP address to the first TOR node with which he or she connects.137 Coupled with the
TOR Project’s own warning that the first server can see “[t]his IP address is using
TOR” destroys any expectation of privacy in a TOR user’s IP address.138
The court also ruled that TOR users do not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their computers and thus got around the maxim that “the appropriate
[Fourth Amendment] inquiry [is] whether the individual had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the area searched, not merely in the items found.”139 The
NIT collected very limited information.140 Moreover, the rise of computer hacking
via the Internet has changed the public’s reasonable expectations of privacy. 141

131.

Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510.
Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 614.
133.
Id.
134.
Id. (emphasis added).
135.
Id. at 616–617.
136.
Id.
137.
United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 617 (E.D. Va. 2016).
138.
Id.
139.
Id. (quoting United States v. Horowitz, 806 F.2d 1222, 1224 (4th Cir.1986)).
140.
Id. at 618 (analogizing the NIT to the pen register in Smith that only captured the numbers dialed, “The
NIT only obtained identifying information; it did not cross the line between collecting addressing information
and gathering the contents of any suspect’s computer.”). Cf. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th
Cir. 2007).
141.
Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 619 (“[h]acking is much more prevalent now than it was even nine years
ago, and the rise of computer hacking via the Internet has changed the public’s reasonable expectations of
privacy. . . Now, it seems unreasonable to think that a computer connected to the Web is immune from invasion.
Indeed, the opposite holds true: in today’s digital world, it appears to be a virtual certainty that computers
accessing the Internet can—and eventually will—be hacked.”). Given the prevalence of hacking, the court
analogized breach of Apple’s private data to TOR users hoping to keep their network information private. (“TOR
users likewise cannot reasonably expect to be safe from hackers. Even if TOR users hope that the TOR network
132.
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Lastly, Matish reasoned that even if a warrant was needed, the Good Faith
Exception applied and suppression should be denied.142 The agents’ reliance on the
NIT warrant was objectively reasonable, and it appeared to the Court that the agents
acted in good faith.143 The agents did not lie to the magistrate, the warrant application
detailed ample probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant, and the affidavit
adequately described the items to be seized and the places to be searched.144
2. Where the Court Found Deployment of the NIT was a “Search”
Circuit courts disagreed as to whether or not the un-amended Rule 41(b) granted a
magistrate jurisdiction for NIT warrants.145 But more importantly, they still disagree
whether deployment of the NIT constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.146
This split stems from the courts’ focus either on the mere collection of the IP
addresses versus the government intrusion onto defendants’ computers. 147 In general,
the courts that focus on the IP address note that there is no expectation of privacy in
IP addresses because of the Third-Party Doctrine and therefore no search has
occurred.148 Conversely, courts that focus on the NIT’s intrusion onto a defendant’s
computer as a constitutionally-protected area usually characterize NIT deployment
as a search.149 Regardless of whether the court concludes there was a search or not,
suppression of the evidence is rarely granted as a remedy.150

will keep certain information private—just as terrorists seem to expect Apple to keep their data private—it is
unreasonable not to expect that someone will be able to gain access.”).
142.
Id.
143.
Id.
144.
Id.
145.
See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
146.
See generally Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 616–617; see infra notes 150–159 and accompanying text.
147.
Compare United States v. Adams, No. 6:16-CR-11-ORL-40GJK, 2016 WL 4212079, at *4 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 10, 2016) with Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 616–617.
148.
See United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 443 (E.D. Pa. 2016); see also Matish, 193 F. Supp.
3d at 615; United States v. Acevedo-Lemus, No. SACR 15-00137-CJC, 2016 WL 4208436, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
8, 2016); United States v. Lough, 221 F. Supp. 3d 770, 775 (N.D. W. Va. 2016).
149.
See United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 528–29 (E.D. Va. 2016); Adams, 2016 WL 4212079,
at *4 (“However, Defendant’s IP address was discovered only after property residing within Defendant’s home—
his computer—was searched by the NIT. The courts which have thus far grappled with the extent to which a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in an IP address have analyzed the issue in the context of a
subpoena to an ISP to identify the person assigned the IP address.”); United States v. Ammons, 207 F. Supp. 3d
732, 738–39 (W.D. Ky. 2016); United States v. Broy, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1045, 1053 (C.D. Ill. 2016).
150. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; United States v. Croghan, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1085-86
(S.D. Iowa Sept. 19, 2016), rev’d and rem’d by United States v. Horton 863 F.3d 1041 (July 24, 2017) and United
States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 36 (D. Mass. 2016) are currently some of the few cases that granted
suppression. The district court in Croghan was overturned and it is probable that the Levin decision was an error
because they relied on authority (United States v. Scott, 260 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 2001)) that the Sixth Circuit itself
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i. United States v. Adams
Like the previous cases, the United States charged Ryan Anthony Adams with receipt
and possession of child pornography stemming from the Playpen investigation. 151
Adams used TOR to access the website and conceal his IP address. The FBI used the
NIT to collect Adams’s IP address on February 20, 2015.
While the court noted that Adams did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the IP address used to access Playpen,152 the court noted that the NIT obtained
Adam’s IP address by searching his computer.153 Once a user’s computer downloads
the content from Playpen, the NIT causes the user’s computer to transmit information
to a computer controlled by the Government.154 Essentially, the NIT travels to the
user’s computer and identifies the IP address and other information before
transmitting it back to a government-controlled computer. 155 Thus, the Adams court
noted that the question of a search under the Fourth Amendment would turn on
whether the IP address should be the focus of the analysis or if Adam’s expectation
of privacy in his computer is the proper subject of analysis.156
Because Adam’s IP address was discovered only after property residing within
his home (the computer) was searched by the NIT, the court concluded the
expectation of privacy in the device is the proper focus of the analysis, and not one’s
expectation of privacy in the IP address residing in that device.157 The court reasoned
that other courts grappling with the reasonable expectation of privacy in an IP address
have analyzed the issue in the distinguishable context of a subpoena to an ISP.158
Instead, Adams disagrees with Werdene improperly mixing the lack of expectation
of privacy associated with an IP address with the expectation of privacy one has in
the computer itself.159 Therefore, because the NIT searched Adam’s computer (which
he did have a reasonable expectation of privacy) to get the IP address (for which
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy), deployment of the NIT constituted
a search under the Fourth Amendment.160

admits was “effectively reversed” in United States v. Master, 614 F.3d 236 (6th Cir. 2010). The Levin decision
is currently on appeal).
151.
Adams, 2016 WL 4212079, at *1.
152.
Id. at *4.
153.
Id.
154.
Id.
155.
Id.
156.
Id.
157.
United States v. States v. Adams, No. 6:16-CR-11-ORL-40GJK, 2016 WL 4212079, at *4 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 10, 2016) (emphasis added).
158.
Id.
159.
Id.
160.
Id.
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II. ANALYSIS

Given the current precedent, a magistrate originally did not have the authority to
issue an NIT warrant outside of her jurisdiction.161 Court opinions holding otherwise
were in error.162 However, after the amendment of Rule 41 and addition of subsection
(b)(6), now magistrates certainly do have that jurisdiction.163 The only question
remaining is if deployment of the NIT constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment requiring the issuance of such a warrant. The use of the NIT constitutes
a search under the Fourth Amendment, even if it only collects information like IP
addresses routinely given to third parties.164 The following section will attempt to
justify these positions and will conclude the amendment of Rule 41 may influence
the “search or no search” analysis going forward.
A. NIT Warrant Jurisdiction and Classification as a “Search”
Despite contrary holdings, under the pre-amended Rule 41(b)(6), a magistrate did
not have jurisdiction to issue a warrant for electronic NIT search extending outside
his jurisdiction.165 Findings of pre-amendment jurisdiction were justified by
subsections (b)(1) and (b)(4).166 The following addresses why these provisions of the
pre-amended Rule 41(b) failed to grant jurisdiction to a magistrate for an NIT search.
Subsection (b)(1) is straightforward: a magistrate judge may authorize the search
or seizure of property within the district in which the judge sits. 167 Most courts
justifying magistrate jurisdiction of the NIT warrant via pre-amendment Rule 41(b)
disregard subsection (b)(1).168 Typically, courts note that the NIT warrant authorizes

161.

See supra Part I.B.1.
If the courts holding deployment of the NIT fell within the previous rule were correct, it would at the
least beg the question of why an amendment to Rule 41(b) was necessary.
163.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6).
164.
See infra notes 190–209 and accompanying text.
165.
But see United States v. Jean, 207 F. Supp. 3d 920 (W.D. Ark. 2016); United States v. Eure, No
2:16cr43, 2016 WL 4059663 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2016); United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585 (E.D. Va.
2016); United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520 (E.D. Va. 2016). The stretching of Rule 41’s conferral of
jurisdiction can likely be rationalized by the court’s unwillingness to suppress condemning evidence for such an
emotionally charged crime like child pornography. Additionally, almost all courts that found the warrant outside
of the magistrate’s authority nonetheless refused suppression because of the Good Faith Exception.
166.
See Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 612.
167.
See United States v. Chipps, 410 F.3d 438, 446 (8th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Kernell, No.
3:08-CR-142, 2010 WL 1408437, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 2, 2010) (“Rule 41(b). . . limits a Magistrate Judge’s
authority to issue warrants only for property within the district.”); United States v. Hernandez, No. 3:08-CR-142,
2008 WL 4748576, at *16 (D. Minn. Oct. 28, 2008) (“[T]he jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge
which, as a general proposition, is limited to the District in which he or she sits.”).
168.
See generally United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 35 (D. Mass. 2016); United States v. Michaud,
No. 3:15–CR–05351–RJB, 2016 WL 337263, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016).
162.
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the NIT to “obtain information . . . from the activating computers.”169 Nearly all
disputes arising from these cases have had activating computers located outside the
magistrate’s jurisdiction, the Eastern District of Virginia. 170 The courts generally
held the defendant’s computer, not the server located in Virginia, was the location
searched.171 Therefore, Rule 41(b)(1) did not authorize those searches because the
place to be searched and information to be seized were located outside of the issuing
court’s jurisdiction.172 This reasoning is sound. Even if the government attempted to
characterize the search as occurring in Virginia, what information could they obtain
from their own server? The NIT may have waited for connections on the server in
Virginia before downloading itself to an outside system, but that installation occurred
outside the issuing jurisdiction. The NIT searches were after information only the
NIT deployment could produce, namely IP addresses.173 That information came from
outside the jurisdiction, not from the mere deployment of the NIT on the Virginia
server.174
The next commonly attempted route to secure jurisdiction for the NIT warrant is
Rule (41)(b)(4).175 That subsection provides:
“[A] magistrate judge with authority in the district has authority to issue
a warrant to install within the district a tracking device; the warrant may
authorize use of the device to track the movement of a person or property
located within the district, outside the district, or both[.]”176

169.
See United States v. Workman, 205 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 126 (D. Colo. 2016), rev’d by United States v.
Workman 863 F.3d 1313 (2017).
170.
See Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 35 (finding that the NIT Warrant was not authorized by Rule 41(b)(1)
where the defendant’s computer was located in Massachusetts); Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *6 (holding that
the NIT Warrant was not authorized by 41(b)(1) “because the object of the search and seizure was [the
defendant’s] computer, not located in the Eastern District of Virginia.”).
171.
See Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 35.
172.
For cases arising from the NIT search that unmasked residents of Virginia, it is arguable that the
jurisdiction of the warrant is satisfied by Rule 41(b)(1). However, such a warrant may face particularity
challenges, as almost all the challenges to the NIT warrant have. After all, the FBI did not know the location to
be searched, since the location was concealed. How then could they state with particularity the place to be
searched?
173.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
174.
See United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 438 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“[T]he NIT may cause an
activating computer—wherever located—to send to a computer controlled by or known to the government
network level messages containing information that may assist in identifying the computer, its location, other
information about the computer and the user of the computer.”).
175.
See United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 612 (E.D. Va. 2016); Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at
442.
176.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(4).
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Further, the federal rules define “tracking device” as “an electronic or mechanical
device which permits the tracking of the movement of a person or object.”177
Circuits have split over analogizing the NIT to a tracking device.178 Courts
disregarding a (b)(4) tracking analogy, note that the NIT was never installed in the
issuing jurisdiction, as required by the statute.179 Proponent courts argue the NIT was
installed in Virginia.180 However, both courts overlook a more fundamental question:
whether the NIT actually “tracked” at all.
Subsection (b)(4) should have been confined to physical tracking: its original
purpose. To bootstrap Rule 41(b)(4) into NIT searches stretches the realm of what
counts as “tracking” beyond its design. Tracking devices are traditionally thought of
as physical beacons placed on physical objects that monitor location over time. 181
The NIT, however, clearly did not “track” the “movement of a person or object.”182
In fact, the NIT did not “track” the “movement” of anything, but rather it installed
computer code onto defendants’ computers, which then caused the computers to
relay the IP addresses to the government-controlled computers in Virginia. 183 The
FBI subsequently subpoenaed the physical location of the IP address from the
ISPs.184 Thus, because the NIT is not an electronic device that permits the “tracking”
of the movement of a person or object,185 the language of Rule 41 and the statutory
definition of “tracking device” do not support qualifying use of the NIT as a tracking
device.186
Moreover, courts characterizing the NIT installation as occurring in Virginia were
misguided. The NIT was uploaded to the Virginia server, but it did nothing until
downloaded to the suspects’ computer, decidedly outside Virginia in nearly all

177.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a)(2)(E).
See supra Part I.C.1; Compare Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431 at 442 with Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at
593 (where the court held the magistrate had authority to issue the warrant under 41(b)(4)). For cases holding
(b)(4) failed to confer jurisdiction see supra note 31 and accompanying text.
179.
See generally Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431; FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(4) (“[A] magistrate judge with
authority in the district has authority to issue a warrant to install within the district a tracking device; the warrant
may authorize use of the device to track . . . outside the district”).
180.
Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 593.
181.
See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
182.
See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
183.
United States v. Adams, No. 6:16-CR-11-ORL-40GJK, 2016 WL 4212079, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10,
2016).
184.
Id.
185.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(a)(2)(E).
186.
Id; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(4). For the multitude of cases arising out of the use of the NIT, the FBI’s
modus operandi has generally been the same: deploy the NIT and retrieve the suspect’s IP address. Subpoena the
ISP for the suspect’s physical location using the IP address. Apply for a search warrant of those premises based
on probable cause obtained from the NIT.
178.
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cases.187 Installment of the NIT on the government-controlled server is analogous to
the government possessing a physical tracking device. When the device is in
government possession and under its control, it cannot be said to have been installed
and tracking the defendant. For purposes of analogy, this would be akin to the
government in Jones claiming that since it had the tracking device in its possession
in the warranted district, it was installed for the purposes of (b)(4).188 Simply put,
you cannot have a tracking device installed in a district without it actually being
deployed.
Defendants electronically contacted the server while maintaining their physical
location outside the jurisdiction.189 When the NIT was deployed by the FBI it was
subsequently installed on the computers located outside of Virginia. 190 That is, when
the NIT actually was deployed then it began “tracking,” if it can be argued it
“tracked” at all. In sum, a piece of code sitting on a government server in a particular
district cannot be said to have been deployed on a defendant residing outside that
district. The NIT remained un-deployed in Virginia until the defendants’ computer
reached out to it. Only then was it installed, but outside the jurisdiction.
1. Deployment of the NIT is a Search—Collection of IP Addresses is Not.
Many circuits held the NIT collection of IP addresses is not a search under the Fourth
Amendment.191 Such analysis disregards the true hinge point: while IP addresses
have no expectation of privacy, the computers that are accessed do. The analysis
turns on whether the courts focus on the location searched or the information
collected.192 Because the NIT intrudes into an area that has a reasonable expectation
187.
See United States v. Michaud, No 3:15–cr–05351–RJB, 2016 WL 337263, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28,
2016); Adams, 2016 WL 4212079, at *6.
188.
See United States v. Henderson, No. 15-CR-00565-WHO-1, 2016 WL 4549108, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
1, 2016) (“The NIT search does not meet the requirements of 41(b)(4) because, even though it was analogous to
a tracking device in some ways, it nevertheless falls outside the meaning of a “tracking device” as contemplated
by the rule. Further, the NIT was installed outside of the district, at the location of the activating computers, not
within the district as required by Rule 41(b)(4).”).
189.
United States v. Adams, No. 6:16-CR-11-ORL-40GJK, 2016 WL 4212079, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10,
2016). But see United States v. Sullivan, 229 F. Supp. 3d 647,654 (N.D. Ohio 2017) (adopting other circuits’
reasoning where the defendant digitally visited, or “touched down” in Virginia and thus the search took place
there); United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 536 (E.D. Va. 2016).
190.
See Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *6; Adams, 2016 WL 4212079, at *6.
191.
See supra Part I.C.1.
192.
After all, as one court has analogized, if the government were to break into your locked garage to find
the car you had stolen, it would surely be a search. The fact that you had no expectation of privacy in a stolen car
would not diminish your expectation of privacy in your home. Likewise, intruding into and pulling information
from a computer (which has an expectation of privacy) that is in a defendant’s home would be just as much a
search. See Adams, 2016 WL 4212079 at *4 (“For example, a defendant has an expectation of privacy in his
garage, even if that defendant lacks an expectation of privacy in the stolen vehicle parked in the garage. Remove
the stolen car from the garage, and no expectation of privacy in the vehicle exists. An IP address located in the
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of privacy, courts that hold collecting IP addresses via the NIT do not constitute a
search are in error.
i. IP Addresses Have No Expectation of Privacy
IP addresses are information voluntarily transmitted to third parties like pen registers
from Smith v. Maryland.193 Thus, defendants’ have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in them. Without an expectation of privacy, there is no Fourth Amendment
implication and therefore no “search.”
In the present cases:
(1) TOR warned Werdene and Matish their connection was not completely
secure.194 This would remove a subjective manifestation of privacy. If they were
warned they were not secure, they couldn’t be said to have subjectively believed they
were private. Analogously, imagine that a neighbor warned you of a hole in your
fence that passed along the sidewalk so that anyone might look through and see into
your yard. In such a case, the subjective manifestation of privacy in your yard given
by the fence would be negated.
(2) Werdene and Matish knew the TOR connection forwarded their IP address to
the first node in the TOR chain.195 This is a fatal flaw in the TOR coffin of
expectation of privacy. The defendants turned over their IP address to a
telecommunication company like in Smith (which is enough to negate Fourth
Amendment concerns), but also forwarded their IP addresses to a third party. 196 This
is akin to telling a stranger what your IP address is. Because a person has no
legitimate expectation of privacy in information, he voluntarily turns over to third
parties, Matish and Werdene cannot assert an expectation of privacy in their IP
address when transferred via TOR.197
(3) Lastly, society is not likely to find their subjective expectation objectively
reasonable, especially for child pornography distribution purposes. This means there
is no objective expectation of privacy.
ii. Computers Have an Expectation of Privacy and Should be the Benchmark
Despite a lack of an expectation of privacy in IP addresses, deploying the NIT on
a defendant’s computer is a search because there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy in personal computers. Viewing NIT collection of data from a computer as a

“open” is akin to a stolen car parked on the street. However, the agents were required to deploy the NIT to search
the contents of Defendant’s laptop, and Defendant enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy in that device.”).
193.
See supra Part I.C.1 (outlining cases finding that deployment of the NIT did not constitute a search).
194.
See supra Part I.C.1 (outlining cases finding that deployment of the NIT did not constitute a search).
195.
Id.
196.
Id.
197.
See supra Part I.B.2.
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non-search overlooks the fact that courts have consistently treated private computers
on par with closed containers198 and overlooks the location of the search for the
subject of the search. Because individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the contents of closed containers,199 defendants also generally retain a reasonable
expectation of privacy in data held within electronic storage devices. 200 Accordingly,
accessing information stored in a computer ordinarily will implicate the owner’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information. A defendant’s IP address is, by
definition, information stored on their computer.201 Therefore, while defendants do
not have an expectation of privacy in their IP address, the government infringed upon
the expectation of privacy in their computers by deploying the NIT. Because the NIT
searches a defendant’s computer to discover the IP address, the expectation of
privacy in the computer is the correct focus of the analysis.
Reliance on the Third-Party Doctrine to hold collection of IP addresses via the
NIT as not a search mischaracterizes the nature of the doctrine. In every instance
where the court has upheld third party arguments, the information has been
transmitted by a third party to the government. 202 What has not occurred is the
government merely noting information collected is likely to be transmitted to a third
party and then directly collecting it themselves.203 By skipping the third party
“middle man,” the FBI in fact receives its information from the NIT via its own
efforts, not a third-party ISP. When the FBI claims to use the Third-Party Doctrine
with the NIT, there is no third party involved, merely the defendant and the FBI. That
the IP address might at some time be transmitted to an ISP does not diminish this
fact.

198.
See H. MARSHALL JARRETT & MICHAEL W. BAILIE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND
OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 3 (2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf; see also United States v. Al-Marri, 230 F.
Supp. 2d 535, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“Courts have uniformly agreed that computers should be treated as if they
were closed containers.”); United States v. Runyan, 275 F.3d 449, 458 (5th Cir. 2001) (assuming that computer
disks are containers and subject to standards governing closed container searches); United States v. Barth, 26 F.
Supp. 2d 929, 936 (W.D. Tex. 1998) (finding that Fourth Amendment protection of closed computer files and
hard drives is similar to protection afforded closed containers and closed personal effects); United States v.
Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007) (“A personal computer is often a repository for private information
the computer’s owner does not intend to share with others. For most people, their computers are their most
private spaces.” (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added)).
199.
See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822–23 (1982).
200.
See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
201.
At least, the NIT cannot access and transmit the IP address without being downloaded to the computer.
202.
Brief of Professor David Gray as Amicus Curiae, Maryland v. Kerron Andrews, 227 Md. App. 350
(2016) (No. 1496); see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
203.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (where the telephone company voluntarily cooperated with
law enforcement in installing pen registers and turning that information over to police).
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Besides infringing on an expectation of privacy, deploying the NIT can be
considered a search under trespass analysis. 204 For trespass purposes, when “the
Government obtains information by physically intruding” on persons, houses,
papers, or effects, “a ‘search’ within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment”
has “undoubtedly occurred.”205 A computer has its own expectation of privacy and
is almost always located inside a defendant’s home.206 Moreover, a computer is
definitely a “paper” or “effect” for the purpose of the Fourth Amendment. 207 Thus,
when the NIT is deployed onto a computer, it is not only intruding into the home, but
also into the papers or effects contained in the computer. The only barrier for NIT
under trespass analysis is the “physical” intrusion. It is true that the NIT code does
not literally walk into the home’s curtilage like officers in Florida v. Jardines,208 nor
is it installed on a car like in Jones.209 However, it would be incongruous of courts
to both hold that the NIT is analogous to a tracking device under 41(b)(4) and then
deny it is a search like the tracking device utilized in Jones. More, on a fundamental
level, deploying the NIT changes the code on the defendant’s computer, an act that
necessarily transforms some physical aspect of its hard drive or memory.210 Thus,
the deployment of the NIT can be considered a “physical” intrusion under trespass
analysis.
2. Suppression is Unwarranted Regardless
Even if the collection of IP addresses was considered a search and the warrants issued
were illegitimate, the Good Faith Exception would apply. FBI agents acted
reasonably on their issued NIT warrant and relied on it for legitimacy of the search.
Thus, suppressing the evidence would do nothing to deter them from the conduct of

204.

See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013); supra PartI-B-2.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414.
206.
See infra note 206 and accompanying text (outlining cases noting that computes are “effects” for Fourth
Amendment analysis).
207.
United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (explaining that “private
information individuals store on digital devices” are “personal ‘papers’ in the words of the Constitution.”); United
States v. Christie, 717 F.3d 1156, 1164 (10th Cir. 2013) (noting personal computers “contain (or at least permit
access to) our diaries, calendars, files, and correspondence – the very essence of the ‘papers and effects’ the
Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.”); United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347, 1351 (11th Cir. 2009)
(“[c]omputers are relied upon heavily for personal and business use. Individuals may store personal letters, emails, financial information, passwords, family photos, and countless other items of a personal nature in
electronic form on their computer hard drives.”).
208.
133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
209.
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
210.
Chris Woodford, Hard Drives, EXPLAIN THAT STUFF (Apr. 3, 2017) http://www.explainthatstuff
.com/harddrive.html (most permanent information on computers is stored in binary bits in the hard drive.
Injecting the NIT into a suspect’s computer necessarily changes at least part of the suspect’s computer memory
or code).
205.
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the search. Deterrence of law enforcement misconduct is the foundational
justification behind the suppression remedy.211 Without deterrence, there will be no
suppression.212 After all, what more could the FBI have done? Before the amendment
of Rule 41, the FBI had no other way to obtain a warrant for outside of Virginia
because they did not know the sources of Playpen’s incoming connections. 213
Incoming connections could be from anywhere in the world, not just the jurisdiction
of Virginia where the server was located. Given that, punishing the FBI by
suppressing the evidence would be a fruitless endeavor, merely chastising them for
something they could not change.
B. Effects of the Amendment of Rule 41(b)
With the Rule 41 amendment, including any jurisdiction where the originating
jurisdiction has been concealed through electronic means (i.e. via TOR), the FBI
need not worry about having its warrants struck for jurisdiction. Essentially, the
amendment resolved the Werdene/Matish debate about Rule 41 electronic
jurisdiction with a stroke of the pen.214 But could the adaptation of Rule 41 have
farther-reaching consequences? The amendment allowed for the issuance of warrants
but did not resolve the question whether NIT deployment is a search. 215 However,
why would the Supreme Court promulgate rules explicitly granting the power to
issue such warrants across jurisdictions if the underlying action is not a search? There
are a few reasons. First, the amended rule merely fixed a circuit split. 216 By amending
the Rule, courts will not stress over whether a magistrate has jurisdiction and
suppression will not be an issue.217 Second, the Court amended the Rule to allow
such warrants so that computers themselves can be searched with probable cause
when they are technically outside the magistrate’s jurisdiction.218 With the new Rule
41 (b)(6), a magistrate could find probable cause and essentially allow the FBI to
hack a computer outside the jurisdiction if it is concealed via electronic means. 219
211.

See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
213.
See generally NIT Warrant Affidavit, supra note 1.
214.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text (Advisory Committee noting the 41(b) amendment resolved
increasing territorial restrictions caused by electronic concealment).
215.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text (Advisory Committee noting the 41(b) amendment resolved
increasing territorial restrictions caused by electronic concealment).
216.
Such circuit splits were becoming more pronounced before the Rule’s amendment. See supra note 31,
37 and accompanying text.
217.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6). Much of the NIT litigation stems from the issuing magistrate’s warrant
jurisdiction. If the magistrate clearly has jurisdiction via Rule 41(b)(6), the Fourth Amendment will be satisfied
for the NIT “searches.” See United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 321 n.3 (2017).
218.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6) (allowing the issuance of a warrant where the district where the media or
information is located has been concealed through technological means).
219.
Id.
212.
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This reasoning represents a massive shift, but not an undue one in the case of child
pornography. Or third, the Court could be considering a revision to the idea of a
“search” in the electronic age. In her concurrence in Jones, Justice Sotomayor noted
that perhaps the Court should revisit Smith in light of the electronic age.220 The
change in Rule 41 could be the beginning of that revisitation. After all, why would
the Court allow issuing a warrant for an action that was not a search? If deploying
the NIT onto computers, which have a legitimate expectation of privacy, is not a
search under the Fourth Amendment, why amend the rule to allow a warrant
issuance? Indeed, what will the present impact be if the FBI remotely searches
computers concealed by TOR via the NIT without a warrant? Arguably, they were
originally a search, but the lack of a warrant would persuade courts originally
focusing on the mere collection of IP addresses to understand that the true focus
should be the search of the computer. The situation is a conundrum – the defense can
ask the FBI why it did not get a warrant for a remote computer search, yet point out
specifically there is a rule that allows the issuance of a warrant for such collection.
The amendment of Rule 41 also may affect the reliance of the Good Faith
Exception. With the change, the Good Faith Exception is a stronger defense than
ever. Warrants issued under Rule 41(b)(6) will ease the authorization of crossjurisdictional electronic data collection where the suspect’s location is concealed via
electronic means.221 In effect, the FBI would not need the Good Faith Exception.
Instead, the warrant will stand on its own feet.
CONCLUSION

With the amendment of Rule 41(b)(6), the question of magistrate power to issue NIT
warrants outside his jurisdiction has been resolved. What remains a question is
whether courts will come to a consensus on the question of deploying the NIT. Does
its deployment constitute a search? The nation adopted the Fourth Amendment out
of fear of a general warrant that would allow law enforcement to search anyone,
anywhere, anytime – and eliminate privacy in our persons, papers, and effects. If the
NIT is found not to be a search, it may be the beginning of a new electronic age of
general warrants, one in which the FBI can implant code on a person’s computer and
pull information from it without restriction by the warrant requirement and probable
cause. The shift may mean warrants collecting IP addresses today could morph to
collect personal documents, pictures, or more tomorrow.

220.
221.

See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
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